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RISK ALLOCATION UNDER THE PRINCIPAL
‘TRADITIONAL’ IRISH FORMS OF BUILDING CONTRACT
Tony Cunningham
School of Surveying and Construction Management
Dublin Institute of Technology, Bolton Street, Dublin 1

Construction projects are risky ventures. The Department of Public Enterprise and
Reform (2009) define risk as the ‘uncertainty of outcome, whether positive or negative.’
Hughes, Champion and Murdoch (2015) point out risks are inevitable and cannot be
eliminated. They can, however, be transferred through appropriate wording in the clauses
of a contract. They argue that a primary function of construction contracts is to allocate
particular risks between the parties in order to identify who bears the cost if a particular
risk comes to pass.
This study examines how contractual risks are allocated to the contracting parties under
the Royal Institute of Architects in Ireland Form, 2012 version, where quantities form
part of the contract, commonly known as ‘the Yellow Form’, (the RIAI Form) and the
Public Works Contract PW CF1 Form v 1.10 (Office of Government Procurement,
2014a) where the design is provided by the employer (the PWC Form).
The Department of Finance has identified that the principal commercial risks borne by
clients and contractors in the delivery of construction projects relate to safety, quality, cost
and time (NPPU, 2007). This study compares and contrasts how the contracts above deal
with various matters which may give rise to uncertainty in delivering these key project
objectives, and presents an overview of these broad risk categories. It does not seek to
provide a detailed examination of every potential risk inherent in the two contracts. In this
regard a summary of the risk allocation under the PWC is tabulated on pages 32 to 38 of
the Report on the Review of the Performance of the Public Works Contract (Office of
Government Procurement, 2014b)

Insurance and Bonding Requirements
Hughes et al. (2015) point out that some of the risks encountered on construction may
result in enormous losses and must be covered by insurance or other form of guarantee.
The most important of these risks arise from personal injury, damage to third party
property, and damage to the works or the existing structures. Insurance is necessary
because the parties would not normally be able to fund the replacement of costly building
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works. Nor, would they typically be able to meet a claim for serious personal injury
caused by an accident on site. Both the RIAI and PWC Forms require the contractor to
insure against damage to property, injury to persons and damage to the works themselves.
The employer is required to insure against damage to the existing structures. Insurance
cover is provided through employer’s liability insurance, public liability insurance, motor
insurance and contractor’s all risks insurance. The employer is required to take out
property insurance to cover existing structures. The minimum levels of cover are set out
in the appendix or schedules to the particular contracts. Consultants appointed under
separate conditions of employment, are typically required to take out professional
indemnity insurance to cover liability for defective design and negligence.
Contractor insolvency represents a particularly onerous risk borne by construction clients.
This risk is typically covered by bonding arrangements. The collapse of the Irish
construction industry and its recent levels of insolvency has led guarantors to limit the
rate of cover provided by bonds. The level of available bond cover has fallen from 25%
of the contract sum to 12½% during the past decade. The PWC typically requires the
contractor to provide a bond and sets out the level of cover required in the contract
schedules.
The RIAI contract is silent on this matter. The Liaison Committee (2006), however,
recommend that private sector clients should arrange appropriate bond cover. Figure 1
below set out their recommended levels of cover and while it is realised that these levels
would now be difficult to acquire, it nevertheless provides a useful benchmark.

Figure 1 Recommended Levels of Bond Cover – Source Liaison Committee, 2006

Achieving Quality Requirements
In the long run, perhaps the greatest source of disappointment and annoyance for
construction clients is where a project fails to meet the expectations of its owners and/or
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users. This may arise through ineffective design or because of defects and/or poor
workmanship. The RIAI and PWC are both contracts where the design is provided by the
employer, who consequently bears the risks arising from deficient or poor design. Risks
associated with defective design are normally covered by professional indemnity
insurance provided by the design team. The aesthetic and functional qualities of the
design are, in general, not issues which are directly addressed by either contract. The
contracts are, however, concerned with the standard of work to be delivered and the
procedures for preventing and dealing with defective work.
Clause 2 of the RIAI contract requires the contractor to ‘carry out and complete the
Works in accordance with the Contract Documents and with the directions and to the
reasonable satisfaction of the Architect.’ The standards of materials and workmanship are
set out in the bill of quantities and specifications. Clause 8 empowers the architect to
request the contractor to provide ‘vouchers to prove that the materials comply’ and to
‘carry out any test of any material and workmanship which the Architect may in writing
require.’ Clause 2 empowers the architect to issue instructions regarding inter alia:
 opening up work for inspection;
 removing and re-executing of non-compliant work;
 dismissing incompetent or misbehaving persons;
 rectifying defects, and
 ‘any other matters appertaining to the proper execution of the Contract.’
The contractor must comply with any such instruction, as otherwise, the architect may
employ others to carry out that work and charge the contractor for it.
Clause 11 of the RIAI Contract authorises the architect ‘to access the Works, workshops
of the Contractor or other places where work is being prepared for the Contract.’ Clause
12 permits the employer to appoint a clerk of works to act as an inspector under the
direction of the architect.
Taken together, these provisions identify that the contractor is responsible for the quality of the
work, and that the architect is the judge of that quality. Non compliant and defective work may be
condemned and the consequent cost of rectifying it is borne by the contractor. Snags are

generally covered by the retention provisions in both contracts. The contractor remains
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liable for latent defects for six years where the contract is signed, or twelve years where it is
executed under seal.
These basic quality control requirements are echoed in Section 8 of the PWC Form, This section
adds that the works must comply with other legal requirements and be carried out in a

workmanlike manner observing proper practice, and materials must be of good quality
and, unless otherwise specified, new. In addition a number quality related measures are
included, which may be said to formalise and clarify, rather than extend, the authority of
the employer’s representative with regard to inspection and testing, and the rectification
of non-compliant work. For example, the employer’s representative may reject whole
sections, or indeed, the works in its entirety. There is also an option for the employer to
accept defective works, in which case the employer’s representative will determine the
reduction in the value of the work which shall be deducted from the contract sum.
Section 8.2 requires the contractor to have quality assurance procedures. Appropriate
quality assurance plans are to be submitted to the employer’s representative who is
entitled to receive QA reports and to carry out spot checks to ensure that the plans are
being properly implemented.
Specialist work
One of the most notable differences between the PWC and the RIAI contracts are the
means by which specialist work is procured. The nomination process contained in the
RIAI contract enables architects to appoint particular subcontractors to carry out specific
work packages for, or to supply materials to the main contractor. These subcontractors
are typically chosen because of their track records for delivering high quality work, and in
many instances, because they carry out areas of the detail design. Where a nominated
subcontractor is responsible for the design of part of the work, the employer will, in
general, bear the risk of consequences arising from defective design. The contractor
nevertheless retains responsibility for ensuring that the specified standards relating to
materials and workmanship are complied with. Where design work is carried out by a
nominated subcontractor the employer should be advised to conclude a collateral
warranty under Clause 37 which guarantees the performance of the specialist’s design.
The collateral warranty should be bonded.
At present, the PWC contract does not contain provisions for nominating subcontractors
and currently specialists, including novated specialists are appointed on a domestic
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subcontractor basis. Where a specialist is responsible for carrying out design work the
main contractor assumes overall responsibility for that design which must be fit for
purpose. In these situations the employer will typically require the contractor to hold
adequate professional indemnity insurance cover. The minimum indemnity limit will be
inserted in the schedules to the contract. Typically these insurances would be kept in
place for at least six years after substantial completion to reflect the statute of limitations
in respect of professional liability. It is likely that any such defects will come to light
within this period (NPPU, 2007).
In certain instances, specialists may be ‘named subcontractors’ where they are selected
from a panel of specialists compiled by the employer. This is by no means a mandatory
procedure, and the contract may contain few or no limitations on the contractor’s freedom
to procure specialist subcontractors. The main contractor may exert considerable pressure
on specialists to lower their prices in order to submit a competitive tender. This may result
in standards being compromised with the consequent increased risk of defective work.
The Report on the Review of the Performance of the Public Works Contract (Office of
Government Procurement, 2014b) recognises this problem and reports that where main
contractors are required to assume the risk of appointing specialists as domestic
subcontractors in competitive tendering environments, that quality can be
‘disproportionately [adversely] affected’. The Report comments on disappointing quality
outcomes, particularly in relation to securing value for money over the life cycle of the
project. It recommends that direct tendering of specialist works packages should be
introduced and that the ‘specialist will be either novated to the main contractor or the
main contractor will, under the terms of their contract, be required to enter into a
subcontract with that named specialist’s tendered price.’ This recommendation appears
to herald a return to a process similar to nomination in the RIAI contract.

Achieving Schedule Targets
The timely delivery of projects is a primary objective of private and many public sector
clients alike. Delays in completing projects are likely to lead to substantial losses for both
clients and contractors.
The basic requirement relating to time under both forms of contract is that the contractor
must complete the works within the contract period. Both contracts, however, contain
provisions whereby extensions of time may be awarded in certain instances. The time
5

certainty risk associated with these particular events are borne by the employer. The
contractor bears the risk of other sources of delay.
Table 1 sets out the various issues for which an extension of time may be awarded under
the RIAI and PWC contracts.
RIAI Clause 30

PW CF 1 Schedule Part 1 K

Force majeure

Change orders

Delayed possession by Employer

Opening up of non-defective works

Exceptionally inclement weather

Employer suspends the work

Rectifying damage covered by insurance.

Contractor suspends the work

Strike or civil commotion.

Incorrect setting out information

Architect’s Instructions

Early partial possession by Employer

Late instructions/information to Contractor

Late instructions

Inability to secure labour or materials.

Delay relating to providing possession.

Delays by Employer’s direct employees

Delay relating to providing a Work Item.

Other Employer defaults.

Interference by Employer’s Personnel.
Rectifying damage covered by insurance.
Rectifying damage due to excluded risks
A weather event
Strike or lockout affecting the Industry
Delays due to Court Orders
Employer’s breach of contract
Unforeseeable archaeological finds
Unforeseeable ground conditions
Unforeseeable utilities in the ground
Delays caused by utility providers

Table 1 – Delay Events under the RIAI and Public Works Contracts.

Where any of the above events occur the contractor may seek an extension of time
(RIAI), or apply to use the programme contingency under the PWC Form.
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Where the contractor is responsible for delaying completion, both contracts provide the
sanction of liquidated damages for the period for which the contractor is in culpable
delay. In cases of serious delay or failure to progress the works, the employer has the
option to suspend/determine the contractor’s employment.
The incorporation of a programme contingency is perhaps the most radical innovation in
the PWC contract. The contract period now includes a programme contingency which is
a time allowance, or float period, to cover delays resulting from the occurrence of one or
more of the Delay Events set out in Table 1 above. The delay period thresholds are
inserted in the contract schedules by the employer prior to the tender. This measure is
designed to reduce the employer’s exposure to the risk of schedule delays. The PWC
contract also contains the following provisions designed to improve time management
during the contract.
The objective of providing a complete design at tender stage is a key factor in facilitating
timely project completion and should reduce the incidence of requests for information on
site and the potential for consequent delay claims.
The PWC contains detailed particulars to be provided in the contractor’s programme.
PWC Section 9.4 requires the contractor to produce a detailed programme and to keep
this up-to-date throughout the project. Programmes must include details of when
instructions or employer supplied items are required and identify the critical path, float
and any flexibility within the programme. They are also required to identify the
workforce and resource estimates required on site. This information enables the
contractor and the employer’s representative to quickly identify variances from the
programme and take appropriate action to remedy the situation. The employer’s
representative may direct that the programme be revised within a fifteen day period and
this requirement is enforced through the power to deduct 15% from the contractor’s
interim payments. The programme may be made a contract document.
PWC Clause 4.10 requires the contractor to give monthly progress reports to the
employer’s representative. These reports must contain specified information and are
designed to facilitate the employer’s representative to effectively monitor progress on site
against the programme and to highlight any information requirements at an early stage.
The discipline of reporting progress is, in itself, a driver to conform to the agreed
programme and strengthens the employer’s representative’s ability to control the process.
7

These measures represent a shift to a more managerial approach by insisting on prompt
and better information combined with strong motivators to achieve contract completion
targets.
The RIAI contract is silent on the matter of the contractor’s programme. However, the
preliminaries sections of bills of quantities or specifications often contain requirements
relating to programmes.

Achieving Cost Certainty
The ability to deliver projects within budget and prevent cost over-runs is one of the most
important tasks carried out by quantity surveyors. Choosing a suitable contract is a crucial
decision in achieving this objective. The Department of Finance states that a key
objective of the Capital Works Management Framework is to: Move towards greater
cost certainty at contract award stage and ensure as far as practicable that the accepted
tender prices and the final cost are the same; (NPPU, 2007 p.18). Similar objectives are
voiced by many private sector clients. Cost certainty is, therefore, a key ingredient in
appraising the success of a project.
The RIAI and PWC contracts are both examples of a lump sum contract. Lump sum
contracts are those where the contract sum is determined before construction starts with
the amount being entered in the agreement. These contracts are based on the contractor’s
commitment to complete the whole of the work for a specific sum. The arrangement
requires that a full design and complete production information is incorporated in the
contractor’s offer at contract award stage. The arrangement therefore promises a high
degree of cost certainty but demands considerable time to prepare and price the tender
documentation. Lump sum contracts may be based either on bills of quantities or on
drawings and specifications.
Hughes et al (2015) make the following comment in relation to lump sum contracts and
rates in bills of quantities:
However, one thing remains constant. In all cases, the contractor offers to do the
work for a price, not for reimbursement of cost. A contractor who estimates too
low is held to the bargain, even if the job runs at a loss. Similarly, for a contractor
who estimates too high, the bargain still holds, despite the employer paying over
the odds. This principle underlies some important decisions in the courts that
demonstrate reluctance to intervene in what turns out to be a bad bargain. … It
applies as much to every rate in a bill as it does to the whole contract sum. This is
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one reason that the bills play such an important role in the management of
construction contracts. An employer who does not wish to have the contract
governed in this way should use an alternative procurement method.
Lump sum contracts are categorised as being either ‘with quantities’ or ‘without
quantities’. Lump sum contracts ‘with quantities’ have been the traditional arrangement
for larger contracts. The purpose of the bill of quantities is ‘to fully describe and
accurately represent the quality and quantity of the work to be carried out’ (ARM4).
Ramus, Birchall and Griffiths (2006) identify that an essential characteristic of this
method is that both the quantities and the unit rates in the bill form part of’ the contract.
Under this arrangement the employer bears the quantities risk. Incorrect quantities are
rectified. Therefore, the contractor’s risk in relation to cost is limited to pricing. This is the
position adopted by the RIAI ‘Yellow Form’.
The lump sum ‘without quantities’ arrangement is generally used for small contracts and
also for subcontracts on larger contracts. The contract documents include the complete
working drawings and details, and a full specification including preliminaries. Under this
arrangement the contractor must measure the works, and is responsible for the accuracy
of the quantities which are not corrected should they be wrong. The contractor therefore
bears both the quantities risk and the pricing risk under this arrangement.
Public sector clients may choose the contractual status of any bills of quantities. It is the
intention of the State to enter into ‘without quantities’ contractual arrangement where a
comprehensive design has been completed at the time of seeking tenders Where
contracting authorities elect not to include the bills as contract documents, the contract
becomes a without quantities arrangement, and in these cases, the contractor assumes the
risk for the accuracy of the quantities. This ‘strict’ view of a lump sum arrangement
represents a major shift in risk transfer from the employer to the contractor.
The Report on the Review of the Performance of the Public Works Contract (OGC, 2014)
has recognised the inefficiencies of contractors having, in effect, to measure the works
requirements in order to check the quantities supplied in the pricing document. The
summary conclusions of the Report suggests that risk (amongst which is the risk of
under-measured quantities) ‘is not being priced in many tenders for a variety of reasons
and, where risk arises it is leading to claims [and] … is not being bought but deferred to
the dispute resolution phase’. The Report concedes that this outcome ‘is often the
opposite of that intended’ in respect of cost certainty. The Report’s first recommendation
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is to reduce ‘the level of risk currently being transferred by making the bill of quantities
the primary reference document for tender purposes on employer-designed contracts’.
In the private sector, clients who prioritise shorter project durations or superior quality
standards may favour contracts which contain a range of cost variables which provide
greater flexibility in appointing subcontractors, selecting materials, and establishing the
extent of the works. The RIAI Form, for example, permits the contract sum to be adjusted
for:
1. prime cost sums and prime cost rates;
2. provisional sums and provisional quantities;
3. variations;
4. labour and material and price variations (fluctuations), and
5. contractors’ claims for loss and expense.
Prime Cost Work
Prime cost sums (PC Sums) are included in the RIAI Form for works to be carried out by
nominated subcontractors or for items to be supplied by nominated suppliers. Prime cost
rates relate to materials supplied by a nominated supplier that are then fixed by the
contractor. Prime cost work is often paid for on a cost reimbursement basis whereby the
contractor is paid the nominated subcontractor’s or supplier’s agreed final account plus
tendered sums for attendances and profit. These accounts can be difficult to control and
are prone to cost overruns. The contractor has little incentive to control costs under this
arrangement which shifts the pricing risk from the contractor to the employer.
Under the PWC contract, specialists are employed by the main contractor on a domestic
basis. Under this arrangement the main contractor, not the client, assumes the specialist’s
pricing risk. The exclusion of nomination provisions also transfers two significant risks
previously borne by employers: liability for failure of the specialist to perform, and
liability for defective design provided by specialists. Both of these risks are now borne by
the contractor under the PWC contract, whereas they are retained by the employer under
the RIAI contract.
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Provisional Work
Provisional sums are included in RIAI contracts to cover “work or costs which cannot be
entirely foreseen, defined or detailed at the time the tendering documents are issued.”
Provisionally measured work typically covers matters such as groundworks, builder’s
work in connection with services, remedial works, and contingencies whose extent could
not be accurately established in advance of opening up the existing structure or carrying
out a site inspection. Under this arrangement the employer bears the quantities risk, and,
where provisional sums are used, the pricing risk as well. As is the case with prime cost
sums, there is little incentive for contractors to complete work covered by provisional
sums efficiently.
One of the central objectives underpinning the PWC contracts is to remove risk inherent
in provisional work by providing complete designs in advance of seeking tenders and,
consequently, to avoid the need to include provisional work.
Variations and Change Orders
Changes are invariably made to the building design during the course of its construction
and therefore both the RIAI and PWC contracts permit variations and change orders.
Variations, however, compromise the cost and time certainty of the project. The extent to
which variations are needed depends largely on the degree to which the design has been
finalised. In general, the provisions coving the valuation of variations are similar in both
the RIAI and PWC Forms, but there is a greater emphasis in the PWC on agreeing the
cost of varied works before an instruction is issued. Variations tend to transfer pricing risk
from the contractor towards the employer.
Price Variation Provisions
Clause 36 of the RIAI Form provides that the contract sum will be adjusted for price
variations to labour and materials arising after the submission of the contractor’s tender.
In practice, however, this provision is usually the subject of post-tender negotiations and
is deleted from the contract. The PWC, on the other hand, is fixed price for a period of 36
months. In effect this means that even very large projects will be covered by this
provision and that it will only apply on exceptionally large building projects or in periods
of hyperinflation.

11

Contractors’ Claims
The RIAI Contract provides that contractors may be reimbursed for loss and expense
where the employer or employer’s agents:
1. delay the contractor from completing on time (a prolongation claim) or
2. reduce the productivity levels being achieved by the contractor (a disruption
claim).
Contractors contractual claims arise from: compliance with architects’ instructions issued
under clause 2, or where the employer fails to provide possession of the site under clause
28 or where ‘any act or default of the Employer delays progress of the Works’ under
clause 29b.
The PWC contract emphasises cost certainty from the outset. Article 4 of the Articles of
Agreement states that: “The Contractor has included in the initial Contract Sum
allowances for all risks, customs, policies, practices, and other circumstances that may
affect its performance of the Contract, whether they could or could not have been
foreseen, except for events for which the Contract provides for adjustment of the initial
Contract Sum.” This is a clear expression that the contract sum will not change except for
the occurrence of specific events set out in the contract. These are described as
‘compensation events’ and they are listed in the schedules to the contract and are shown
in Table 2 below.
Compensation Events

Optional Compensation Events

Change orders

Incorrect quantities over €500

Opening up of non-defective works

Unforeseeable archaeological finds

Employer suspends the work

Unforeseeable ground conditions

Contractor suspends the work

Unforeseeable utilities in the ground

Incorrect setting out information

Delays caused by utility providers

Early partial possession by Employer
Late instructions
Delay relating to providing possession.
Delay relating to providing a Work Item.
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Interference by Employer’s Personnel.
Rectifying damage due to excluded risks
Employer’s breach of contract
Table 2 – Compensation Events under the Public Works Contracts.

One of the principles claimed to underpin the PWC contracts is that risk should be
allocated to the party best able to manage it. Of particular note are the risks associated
with incorrect quantities, unforeseen ground conditions, archaeology, utilities and
relocation of utilities, which may be transferred to the contractor where it is considered
that there is sufficient information to allow the risks to be accurately priced. The PWC
contracts envisage that the design will be comprehensively developed at contract award
stage in order to allow this risk transfer to occur. Regarding the incorrect quantities risk
this will apply only in the event that the quantities risk is retained by the employer.
The programme contingency also applies to compensation events. This float period
covers delay costs resulting from the occurrence of one or more of the compensation
events. This measure reduces the employer’s exposure to additional costs arising from
schedule delays for which the employer retains the risk. The contractor only becomes
entitled to “expenses unavoidably incurred” during a period of delay after the first
programme contingency threshold has been exhausted. During the second threshold the
contractor will be entitled to half of these expenses. The PWC contract does not provide
for the recovery of disruption or loss of productivity costs.
There is an alternative provision to value delay costs the on a daywork basis. In these
cases the works are valued at the rates submitted by the contractor within the tender and
which form part of the tender assessment. It is likely that such rates will be heavily
discounted in order to increase the contractor’s chances of winning the contract.
The inclusion of ‘time bars’ and written notices in the PWC further regulates the
contractor’s entitlement to claim compensation. All claims for compensation must be
notified in writing to the employer’s representative within twenty working days of their
becoming [or should have become] aware of the occurrence of a compensation event. This
notice must be subsequently supported by full details. Failure to comply with these
requirements results in the contractor losing his/her entitlement to compensation.
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Payment Risk
Interim payments are a core contractual obligation. Hughes et al. (2015) point out that the
employer’s primary contractual obligation is to pay the contractor. They maintain that the
contractor should be paid promptly and fully in accordance with the contract unless there
are valid contractual reasons for withholding part of the payment. Keane (2001) notes that
under the RIAI contract that ‘The employer must honour the Certificate within seven days
of presentation. Failure to do so is a ground for the Contractor to determine his own
employment under the contract’ (p. 267).
Cash flow is very important for contracting organisations. Most contractors depend on
prompt cash-flow for the smooth operation of their business. The RIAI and PWC
contracts set out defined timetables for making payments and late or inadequate
certification can cause severe cash flow difficulties; particularly if this occurs on a
number of projects. In a worst case scenario these could be a significant factor in leading
to a contractor’s insolvency. Subcontractors, particularly domestic subcontractors, are
likewise also vulnerable in these situations as they currently operate on pay-when-paid or
extended credit arrangements.1
The quantity surveyor plays a leading role in the certification process by recommending
to the architect or employer’s representative how much money is to be paid to the
contractor. This valuation represents the amount of work duly executed, materials
properly brought onto site, and, where agreed, certain materials held off site. Best practice
dictates that interim certificates should be carried out promptly and be as accurate as
possible. This will ensure that contractors are fully paid thereby minimising the
potentially disastrous consequences of cash-flow difficulties.
An important point to note regarding interim certificates is that they are not conclusive.
This means that the value of elements of work contained in earlier certificates may be
subsequently adjusted or corrected. This is a particular problem where defective work is
condemned and must be rectified by the contractor at his own expense. This can have a
disastrous impact on the project’s profitability and/or programme. Clients may struggle to

1

These practices will be outlawed when the Construction Contracts Act 2013 is commenced. At the time of

writing this legislation is awaiting commencement pending the establishment of a panel of adjudicators.
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recover overpayments in difficult cases, particularly where the contractor has completed
the works and left the site, or has become insolvent.

Conclusion
This study has outlined the allocation of the principal contractual risks under the RIAI
‘Yellow’ and the PW CF1 contracts. The principal commercial risks borne by clients and
contractors in the delivery of construction projects were identified as relating to safety,
quality, time, cost and payment.
Commercial risks associated with safety are covered under both contracts through the
employer’s liability, public liability and motor insurance policies which are taken out by
the contractor. These may be arranged by the employer where they are not taken out by
the contractor. Cover for damage to the works or the existing buildings and their contents
can be transferred to the insurance industry. Insolvency protection may be arranged by
means of performance bonds.
Cost certainty is heavily emphasised in the PWC contract. The agreement that the
contract sum covers all foreseeable risks apart from those set out in the schedules, the
removal of prime cost and provisional sums, provisionally measured work, material and
labour price variations and the inclusion of a programme contingency are all designed to
minimise or eliminate remeasurement and final accounting negotiations and it must be
concluded that the contract is very strong on this aspect. The RIAI contract, on the other
hand, is significantly more flexible in terms of catering for an evolving design and may
be more appropriate where speed and quality are prioritised over cost.
Regarding quality standards the PWC contract reinforces the RIAI quality inspection and
testing powers and requires the contractor to operate a quality assurance system. These
measures are designed to foster a culture of high workmanship standards which may lead
to fewer defects in the works. Potential problems, however, may arise in the area of
specialist work where competitive tendering pressures may lead to inferior design and/or
less sustainable options being chosen than would be the case under the RIAI nomination
process.
Regarding delivering the contract on time, the PWC philosophy of providing a
comprehensive design at tender stage, combined with the requirement to develop a
detailed resourced programme should aid the contractor to identify potential blockages
15

and slippages and lead to fewer delays being experienced on site. Minimising the
expenditure of the programme contingency also provides an added incentive for the
contractor to complete the project promptly. Nevertheless, the requirement to complete a
fully comprehensive design before tenders can be sought is time consuming. It is
possible, if not probable, that the more flexible conditions in the RIAI contract may
deliver an overall shorter development programme.
With regard to the PWC requirement for contractors to bear ‘unforeseen risks’ and risks
in connection with uncertain particulars, this must lead to either increased tender levels, or
contractors becoming dangerously exposed to potentially catastrophic losses which
could, in turn, have serious rebound consequences for public sector clients.
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